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TOWARD A NEW STANDARD: HOPE FOR
GREATER UNIFORMITY IN THE TREATMENT
OF HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT
CLAIMS
INTRODUCTION
[A1lI acts by any one group (or individual) [can adversely affect]
others. One side's freedom can always be seen as the other side's
loss of security, one side's equal treatment can seem like the
other's unequal treatment, one group's pursuit of its own interest
can always be called intolerance of any other group that is af-
fected by that pursuit.'
Inequality in the treatment of the sexes and incidents of sexual harass-
ment have long been a problem in the workplace. The question is asked:
can equality between men and women in the workplace ever be
achieved? Are Americans destined to view equality as a tug-of-war
game at which one sex must win and the other sex must lose?2 Surveys
and studies show that incidents of sexual harassment are severely under
reported and, therefore, more prevalent than immediately apparent.'
Reasons for an individual's failure to report sexual harassment include:
fear of losing one's job, need for a future job reference, assumption that
reporting harassment would not change anything, fear of being accused
of inviting the harassment, fear that reporting harassment would draw
public attention to one's private life, and aversion to the emotional stress
that filing a lawsuit would bring.4
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, through its phrase "terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment," attempted to fight the dispa-
1. Nancy S. Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myths and Powerless Men: The Idealogy of Reasonable-
ness in Sexual Harassment Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1177, 1221 (1990) (citations omitted).
2. The majority of this Comment concentrates on sexual harassment of women, because
this is more commonplace than sexual harassment of men. The concepts in this Comment,
however, are also meant to apply to heterosexual men and to homosexual people as victims of
sexual harassment, since these groups are increasingly becoming the victims of sexual
harassment.
3. See Stephen M. Crow & Clifford M. Koen, Sexual Harassment: New Challenge for
Labor Arbitrators?, ARB. J., June 1992, at 9 (revealing through statistics the disparity between
people who have experienced sexual harassment and those who have reported sexual harass-
ment); Donald J. Petersen & Douglas P. Massengill, Sexual Harassment Cases Five Years after
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 18 EMPLOYEE REL L.J. 489, 489 (1992-93) (citing surveys
which show that the number of people who report sexual harassment is much lower than the
number exposed to sexual harassment).
4. Petersen & Massengill, supra note 3, at 489.
5. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988). This Act states in relevant part:
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rate and discriminatory treatment of men and women in the workplace.6
The problem, however, has been that the Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Commission (EEOC) and the courts have approached hostile work
environment sexual harassment claims environment in an "ad hoc"
manner; thereby inadequately addressing the concerns of both potential
plaintiffs and defendants in these Title VII claims.7
This Comment develops a new standard that courts may use to evalu-
ate hostile work environment sexual harassment claims. "Quid pro quo"
sexual harassment and hostile work environment harassment are two
widely recognized theories under which a sexual harassment claim can
be brought. A claim of quid pro quo harassment occurs whenever "a
supervisor conditions the granting of an economic or other job benefit
upon the receipt of sexual favors from a subordinate, or punishes that
subordinate for refusing to comply."8 This Comment does not address
quid pro quo sexual harassment, but instead addresses only hostile work
environment sexual harassment. Part I provides a brief summary of the
development of hostile work environment sexual harassment claims.
Part II describes the conflicts which have arisen over the current stan-
dards used to evaluate hostile work environment claims. Part DI out-
lines the new standard proposed by this Comment, and part IV
articulates the standard in detail and analyzes the five elements of this
new standard.
I. Ti DEVELOPMENT OF THE HOSTILE WORK ENvmolNmENT
SEXUAL HARAssmENT CLAIM
Womens' fight for equality in the workplace began when women ac-
cidentally obtained coverage under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.9 In 1963, while senators debated the passage of this Act, one de-
bater added the term "sex" to the wording of the Act in an effort to
make the coverage of the Act so broad that it would be defeated. Much
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin
Id.
6. Id.
7. Note, Sexual Harassment Claims of Abusive Work Environment Under Title VII, 97
HARv. L. Rnv. 1449, 1458 (1984).
8. Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F2d 881, 897 (1st Cir. 1988).
9. CHARnEs & BARBARA WaLEN, THE LoNGEsT DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE IS-TORY OF
m 1964 CIvi. RIGHTs Acr 233-34 (1985).
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to the proponent's surprise, the addition of "sex" resulted in a large new
group of constituents who rallied behind the Civil Rights Act of 1964.10
Despite what appeared to be a victory for women, it was almost two
decades before the EEOC developed guidelines for defining a claim of
hostile work environment sexual harassment under Title VII.1
The federal courts first recognized a hostile work environment cause
of action in Bundy v. Jackson.2 The Bundy court borrowed its reason-
ing from cases in which racial harassment was found to create a hostile
work environment in violation of Title VII. 3 Therefore, the District of
Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals paved the way for the sexual harass-
ment hostile work environment claim. The Bundy court recognized that
sexual hostility in a workplace could charge the atmosphere with an ani-
mus which interfered with "terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment," regardless of whether the employee actually lost any tangible job
benefits. 4
10. Id. at 234.
11. The EEOC guidelines have been codified in the Code of Federal Regulations, and
they state:
(a) Harassment on the basis of sex is a violation of section 703 of Title VII. Unwel-
come sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct
of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment when (1) submission to such conduct is
made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual's employment,
(2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for
employment decisions affecting such individual, or (3) such conduct has the purpose or
effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an
intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.
Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1993). Subsection
(a)(1) and (a)(2) refer to quid pro quo sexual harassment claims. Id. But this Comment con-
centrates on hostile work environment sexual harassment claims, which have arisen under
subsection (a)(3) of that Code. Id.
12. 641 F.2d 934, 943-44 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
13. Id. at 945. In Bundy, the court explained the similarity between the creation of a
racially hostile work environment and a sexually hostile work environment:
The relevance of these "discriminatory environment" cases to sexual harassment is be-
yond serious dispute. Racial or ethnic discrimination against the company's minority
clients may reflect no intent to discriminate directly against a company's minority em-
ployees, but in poisoning the atmosphere of employment it violates Title VII. Sexual
stereotyping ... may be benign in intent, and may offend women only in a general,
atmospheric manner, yet it violates Title VII. Racial slurs, though intentional and di-
rected at individuals, may still be just verbal insults, yet they too create Title VII liabil-
ity. How then can sexual harassment, which injects the most demeaning sexual
stereotypes into the general work environment and which always represents an inten-
tional assault on an individual's innermost privacy, not be illegal?
it.
14. Id. at 943-44.
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Following the EEOC guidelines and the precedent established in
Bundy, the Eleventh Circuit went one step further and established ele-
ments that constitute a hostile work environment in Henson v. City of
Dundee.' It was necessary to specify the elements because the court
determined that not all instances of sexual harassment would establish a
Title VII violation. The Eleventh Circuit set forth the following ele-
ments: "(1) The employee belongs to a protected group .... (2) The
employee was subject to unwelcome sexual harassment .... (3) The har-
assment complained of was based upon sex.... (4) The harassment com-
plained of affected a 'term, condition, or privilege' of employment....
[and] (5) Respondeat superior.' 16
In 1986, the Supreme Court recognized hostile work environment
sexual harassment as a claim under Title VII in Meritor Savings Bank v.
Vinson.17 The Court acknowledged that Title VII not only governs in-
stances in which there exists "'economic' or 'tangible' discrimination,"
but also hostile environment claims.' 8 The Court held that "[flor sexual
harassment to be actionable, it must be sufficiently severe or pervasive
'to alter the conditions of [the victim's] employment and create an abu-
sive working environment.' "19 Other than opening the door to claims of
hostile work environment sexual harassment, this decision did not pro-
vide the lower courts with many guidelines for deciding these cases. The
Court simply stated that the alleged sexual harassment must be "unwel-
come" 20 and that employers will not always be liable for the actions of
15. 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982).
16. Id. at 903-05.
17. 477 U.S. 57 (1986). In Meritor, Mechelle Vinson applied for a job at which time she
met Sidney Taylor, the vice president of Meritor Bank. Ms. Vinson received a job as a teller.
Initially, Ms. Vinson said that Taylor treated her in a fatherly way, but then he began to make
repeated demands upon her for sexual favors. At first she refused, but then she gave in to his
advances and began a sexual relationship with him. Over the course of the next several years,
Ms. Vinson said she had intercourse with Mr. Taylor forty to fifty times. Ms. Vinson said that
Taylor also fondled her while in front of other employees, exposed himself to her, and even
forcibly raped her a number of times. Id. at 59-60.
18. Id. at 64. The Court stated that "[t]he phrase 'terms, conditions, or privileges of em-
ployment' evinces a congressional intent "'to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treat-
ment of men and women"' in employment." Id. (quoting Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc.,
444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1971)).
19. Id. at 67 (quoting Henson, 682 F.2d at 904). This holding has been interpreted by
lower courts to require an objective determination of whether a work environment is hostile.
This objective determination has been a point of significant contention among lower courts.
Some courts have adopted a "reasonable person" standard, and other courts adopted a "rea-
sonable woman" standard, since sexual harassment is so inherently gender biased. See infra
part II.A.
20. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 68-69.
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their employees.2 At best, the objective "reasonable person" standard
has resulted in different circuits adopting their own guidelines for what
constitutes a hostile work environment. At worst, Meritor has resulted
in different judgments on sexual harassment cases amongst the circuits.'
The Supreme Court most recently addressed claims of hostile work
environment sexual harassment in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. 3
There, the Court upheld the Meritor standard, requiring conduct "severe
or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work en-
vironment - an environment that a reasonable person would find hos-
tile or abusive."'' 4 The Court also held that the victim must subjectively
perceive the environment as abusive, or there could be no Title VII
claim.2 The principal holding of Harris, however, was that psychologi-
cal injury is not necessary to make a claim under Title VII.26 The Court
stated:
[W]hether an environment is "hostile" or "abusive" can be deter-
mined only by looking at all the circumstances. These may in-
lude the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity;
whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere of-
fensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an
employee's work performance. The effect on the employee's psy-
chological well-being is, of course, relevant to determining
whether the plaintiff actually found the environment abusive. But
while psychological harm, like any other relevant factor, may be
taken into account, no single factor is required. 7
Aside from this narrow holding, the Court again refused to establish any
definitive guidelines for what constitutes a hostile environment, leaving
the lower courts once again in a position of uncertainty.
21. 1& at 72. The Court refused to adopt a bright line rule for when an employer is liable
for the sexually harassing activities of its employees. However, the Court stated that lower
courts should look to agency principles for guidance, but should also consider that Congress
desired at least some limits on the types of employee activities for which employers would be
held liable under Title VII. Id.
22. The different interpretations of federal circuit courts of what constitutes a claim of
hostile work environment sexual harassment claim will be discussed later in this Comment.
See infra part II.B.
23. 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993).
24. Id. at 370.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 371.
27. Id.
[Vol. 78:190
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II. CoNFLicrs OVER How TO IDENTIFY A HOSTILE WoR
ENVIRONMENT
The Supreme Court's "ad hoc" approach to determining what consti-
tutes hostile work environment sexual harassment has left lower courts
confused as to how to analyze these Title VII claims. Justice Scalia iden-
tified the problem when he stated:
"Abusive" (or "hostile," which in this context I take to mean the
same thing) does not seem to me a very clear standard - and I
do not think clarity is at all increased by adding the adverb "ob-
jectively" or by appealing to a "reasonable person's" notion of
what the vague word means. Today's opinion does list a number
of factors that contribute to abusiveness,.., but since it neither
says how much of each is necessary (an impossible task) nor iden-
tifies any single factor as determinative, it thereby adds little cer-
titude. As a practical matter, today's holding lets virtually
unguided juries decide whether sex-related conduct engaged in
(or permitted by) an employer is egregious enough to warrant an
award of damages.28
The problems Justice Scalia identified are evident in the debate between
the circuits concerning what standard of evaluation should be used.
They are also evident in the efforts of the circuit courts to clarify the
vague Supreme Court standard through development of their own hos-
tile work environment criteria.
A. The Reasonable Person Versus the Reasonable Woman
One major point of confusion has been the standard used to evaluate
the severity of a hostile work environment. The circuit courts have used
a number of different standards, including: the reasonable person stan-
28. Id. at 372 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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dard,29 an objective/subjective standard,3° and the "reasonable woman"
standard.3'
The reasonable person standard has been criticized for a number of
reasons. First, it has been argued that "a sex-blind reasonable person
standard tends to be male-biased and tends to systematically ignore the
experiences of women. '32 Also, the reasonable person standard suggests
that there is some view of sexual harassment which all people share.33
Since men and woman view sexual harassment differently, one might
wonder whether there can be one objective viewpoint by which to ana-
lyze all hostile environment cases.34 The problem is not that there are no
29. Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 898 (1st Cir. 1988) (stating that the
trier of fact should consider the perspective of the woman and the man when judging a hostile
environment claim); Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611, 620 (6th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987) (stating that the trier of fact should adopt the perspective of a
reasonable person when judging a hostile work environment claim).
30. Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 370 (stating that a work environment alleged to be hostile should
be viewed from a reasonable person perspective and from the victim's subjective perspective);
Dockter v. Rudolf Wolff Futures, Inc., 913 F.2d 456,459 (7th Cir. 1990) ("district court should
employ both an objective and subjective analysis"); Paroline v. Unisys. Corp., 879 F.2d 100,
105 (4th Cir. 1989) (evaluating hostile environment from an "objective perspective and from
the point of view of the victim").
31. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878-79 (9th Cir. 1991) (adopting a reasonable woman
standard); Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1482 (3d Cir. 1990) (stating that
sexual harassment must affect a reasonable person of the same sex as the victim). See gener-
ally Robert S. Adler & Ellen R. Peirce, The Legal; Ethical and Social Implications of the
"Reasonable Woman" Standard in Sexual Harassment Cases, 61 FORDHAM L. REv. 773 (1993);
Sally A. Piefer, Comment, Sexual Harassment from a Victim's Perspective: The Need for the
Seventh Circuit to Adopt the Reasonable Woman Standard, 77 MARQ. L. REv. 85 (1993); Note,
The Reasonableness of the "Reasonable Woman" Standard.- An Evaluation of Its Use in Hostile
Environment Sexual Harassment Claims Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 21 HoFsTRA
L. REv. 483 (1992).
32. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 879.
33. Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of Workplace
Norms, 42 VAND. L. REv. 1183, 1202 (1989).
34. In Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881 (1st Cir. 1988), the First Circuit
observed that such comments as "great figure" or "nice legs," can be viewed very differently
by men and women. Id at 898. A male supervisor might find these comments harmless and
even legitimate, whereas a female employee might find these comments offensive. Id. See
Collins & Blodgett, Sexual Harassment... Some See It ... Some Won't, HARV. Bus. Rv.,
Mar.-Apr. 1981, at 78-80, 92-93 (stating that sexual harassment has been characterized as
harmless joking, but that is not how it feels to women; the article also reported that looking a
woman up and down is three times as acceptable to men as to women); Ehrenreich, supra note
1, at 1208 n.115 (stating that many men believe that women could avoid sexual harassment if
they dressed properly and if they behaved properly); Stephanie B. Goldberg, Hostile Environ-
ments, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1991, at 90 (reaffirming that men and women see things differently); A.
ASTRACHAN, How MEN FEEL: THEIR RESPONSE TO WOMEN'S DEMANDS FOR EQUALrY AND
POWER 88 (1988) (reporting that many men feel it is just a joke when they sexually proposi-
tion a woman).
[Vol. 78:190
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factors which can be used to establish a hostile environment, but rather
that the objective standard allows too much discretion in defiping what
constitutes a hostile work environment.35
Not only is there a vast difference between the experiences of men
and women, there is also a broad range in perspectives among women.36
For that reason, circuit courts have adopted a reasonable woman stan-
dard because they do not believe that a reasonable person standard
could adequately take into consideration the unique experiences of wo-
men.37 Although there is a broad range of perspectives even among wo-
men, there are still common experiences women share that men do not.
These experiences make women more conscious of sexual harassment.
Women have been "disproportionately victims of rape and sexual as-
sault," and thus have a greater incentive to be concerned with abusive
sexual behavior.38 On the other hand, since men have rarely been the
victims of sexual assault, they may not appreciate "the underlying threat
of violence that a woman may perceive. ' 39 Another difference between
men and women is the attitudes women have about their role in the
workplace.' Since women are relative newcomers to the workplace,
they must deal with many difficulties, which can include: finding men-
tors, overcoming stereotypical views of women, and proving their com-
petence.41 Consequently, sexual harassment in the workplace only
undermines women who are working towards equality.
B. The Excessive Variation in Outcome and Analysis from Circuit to
Circuit
The ad hoc approach taken towards claims of hostile work environ-
ment sexual harassment has led to great variance from circuit to circuit.
Cases with similar factual situations have resulted in opposite court hold-
ings. For example, circuit courts have taken opposing viewpoints on
35. This Comment advocates the establishment of factors to analyze what constitutes a
hostile work environment. Common factors would give both the plaintiff and the defendant
warning as to what behavior is inappropriate and what would constitute a hostile environ-
ment. The current standard, however, allows too much discretion and gives no real guidance
since the reasonable person is an amorphous concept that is impossible to define. See infra
Part IV (discussing the proposed standard).
36. Abrams, supra note 33, at 1202.
37. See supra note 31 (citing cases that adopted a reasonable woman standard).
38. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872,879 (9th Cir. 1991); see also Abrams, supra note 33, at
1205-06 (discussing the different views that men and women hold towards sex).
39. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 879.
40. Abrams, supra note 33, at 1204.
41. Id at 1204-05.
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whether psychological harm is necessary to prove a hostile environment;
some courts find psychological harm necessary to prove harassment,
while others have found it completely unnecessary.42 Also, courts have
taken opposing positions on whether displaying pornography throughout
an office creates a hostile environment.4 3 These are only a few exam-
ples, but the point is that such diversity among the circuit courts leaves a
sexual harassment victim at the mercy of a particular circuit court's atti-
tude towards sexual harassment. Not knowing whether a claim will con-
stitute sexual harassment means that a victim may be put through an
arduous trial, only to discover afterwards that a particular circuit will not
recognize sexual harassment in the particular circumstance. A clearer
and more defined standard would allow plaintiffs to know what factually
constitutes a hostile environment so that they can assess the parameters
of their case before expending time, money, and energy on a trial. Also,
a defined standard would put potential defendants on notice of what be-
havior to avoid.
Furthermore, circuits differ not only in judicial results, but also in the
different factors considered important to sexual harassment cases.'
42. Compare Ellison, 924 F.2d at 877-78 with Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611,
620 (6th Cir. 1986), cert denied, 841 U.S. 1041 (1987) (taking opposite views on the necessity
of psychological harm).
43. Compare Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1485 (3d Cir. 1990) with
Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 622 (differing on whether the display of pornography creates a hostile
work environment).
44. Burns v. McGregor Elec. Indus., Inc., 989 F.2d 959, 964 (8th Cir. 1993) (stating that
the following elements must be proven in a hostile environment claim: "(1) she belongs to a
protected group; (2) she was subject to unwelcome sexual harassment; (3) the harassment was
based on sex; (4) the harassment affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment; and
(5) [the employer] knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take proper
remedial action."); Ellison, 924 F.2d at 875-76 (explaining "that a hostile environment exists
when an employee can show (1) that he or she was subjected to sexual advances, requests for
sexual favors, or other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature, (2) that this conduct was
unwelcome, and (3) that the conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the condi-
tions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment."); Andrews,
895 F.2d at 1482 (holding that five factors must be considered to prove a hostile environment:
"(1) the employees suffered intentional discrimination because of their sex; (2) the discrimina-
tion was pervasive and regular; (3) the discrimination detrimentally affected the plaintiff; (4)
the discrimination would detrimentally affect a reasonable person of the same sex in that
position; and (5) the existence of respondeat superior liability."); Dockter v. Rudolf Wolff
Futures, Inc., 913 F.2d 456, 459 (7th Cir. 1990) (stating that "[for... sexual conduct to be
actionable, 'it must be sufficiently severe or pervasive "to alter the terms or conditions of [the
victim's] employment and create an abusive working environment" "')(quoting Henson v.
City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982)); Paroline v. Unisys. Corp., 879 F2d 100,
105 (4th Cir. 1989) (stating that "the plaintiff must show (1) that the conduct in question was
unwelcome, (2) that the harassment was based on sex, (3) that the harassment was sufficiently
pervasive or severe to create an abusive working environment, and (4) that some basis exists
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Again, such differences in determining factors means that particular
claimants will succeed or fail in their claims not because of the merits of
their case, but because of the geographical location of their claim.
III. A PRoposAL
The standard proposed by this Comment would eliminate the dispute
over the proper manner by which to evaluate hostile work environment
claims. It would also minimize the differences among the circuit courts,
because it contemplates a given set of factors by which to evaluate a
hostile work environment.45 These factors have been developed by ex-
amining the opinions of many circuit court cases in an effort to distill
common themes into one set of factors. As the Supreme Court has re-
quired, these factors take into consideration the totality of the circum-
stances.46 They are also designed to operate through a defined
methodology. For example, the burden of proof for each of the factors
begins with the plaintiff, but if the victim of harassment introduces evi-
dence regarding a particular factor, then a rebuttable presumption would
arise as to that factor. The burden of proof would then shift to the de-
fendant, who would have to produce evidence to counter the presump-
tion. It would then be up to the trier of fact to weigh the evidence and
reach a decision.
This new standard would provide clarity and specificity as to what
constitutes a hostile work environment, thus remedying the deficiencies
of the current standard.47 This clarity and specificity also would further
the goal of Title VII in eliminating discrimination from the workplace.48
Moreover, clarity would warm the chill between the sexes which might
for imputing liability to the employer"); Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 619-20 (stating that the "plain-
tiff, to prevail in a Title VII offensive work environment sexual harassment action, must assert
and prove that: (1) the employee was a member of a protected class; (2) the employee was
subjected to unwelcomed sexual harassment in the form of sexual advances, requests for sex-
ual favors, or other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature; (3) the harassment com-
plained of was based upon sex; (4) the charged sexual harassment had the effect of
unreasonably interfering with the plaintiff's work performance and creating an intimidating,
hostile, or offensive working environment that affected seriously the psycho logical [sic] well-
being of the plaintiff; and (5) the existence of respondeat superior liability").
45. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 370 (1993) (stating that conduct must be
"severe and pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work environment-
an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive").
46. Id. at 371.
47. See supra Part II; see also Note, supra note 7, at 1458.
48. Note, supra note 7, at 1458.
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occur when men and women are uncertain about what is and what is not
appropriate behavior.49
In addition, this new standard would be easy for circuit courts to ap-
ply since it is a natural extension of what they are already doing. The
majority of circuit courts have already developed factors by which to
analyze hostile work environment sexual harassment.50 This new stan-
dard, however, would provide one set of factors by which all hostile
work environment cases could be analyzed, thereby adding consistency
to current analysis.
IV. A NEW STANDARD FOR HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT SEXUAL
HARASSMENT
This proposed standard is composed of five factors. They are: (1)
sexual harassment is directed at the individual employee, or sexual har-
assment is so overwhelming as to permeate the general work environ-
ment; (2) employer's reaction to the existence of sexually harassing
behavior in the workplace is inadequate; (3) employee regards the con-
duct as undesirable, offensive, or unwelcome; (4) employee subjectively
perceives the situation to be harassing;51 and (5) harassing behavior in-
terferes with the employee's well-being or ability to perform the job.
To bring a claim of sexual harassment, an employee would character-
ize the specific harassment as fitting under these identified factors. The
employee should not be required to introduce evidence to support all of
the factors; rather, the individual should bring forth evidence supporting
as many factors as possible. If there is evidence introduced at trial that is
sufficient to establish the factor, then a presumption arises that the em-
ployer created a hostile environment as contemplated by the specific fac-
tor. The burden thereafter shifts to the employer to rebut the existence
of the factor.5 2
49. Id.
50. See supra note 44 (listing circuit courts that have already adopted factors by which to
evaluate hostile environment sexual harassment claims).
51. Factor 3 and factor 4 differ in that factor 3 is an objective determination of whether
the situation is undesirable, offensive, or unwelcome, and factor 4 is a subjective determina-
tion of whether a particular employee considers a situation to constitute harassment.
52. Under the law of evidence, a presumption is defined as follows:
[A] genuine presumption is raised by a basic fact or facts that, when accepted as true by
the trier, give rise to a mandatory inference, properly called a presumed fact. Once the
basic facts are believed, the resulting presumed fact must be accepted by the trier un-
less it is rebutted by contravening evidence.
GRAHAM C. LILLY, AN INTRODUCrION To THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 56 (2d ed. 1987) (empha-
sis omitted). Technically, each of the factors presented in this article are basic facts which,
[Vol. 78:190
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The trier of fact should be instructed on all of the factors. It is then
the job of the trier of fact to examine the factors in the aggregate and
determine whether the factors weigh more heavily in favor of the plain-
tiff or the defendant. Some factors carry more weight than others, as
explained below. The trier of fact should be instructed as to which fac-
tors are more determinative than others. Those factors which determine
a sexual harassment claim are articulated in the following discussion.
A. Sexual Harassment Is Directed at the Individual Employee, or
Sexual Harassment Is So Overwhelming as to Permeate the
General Work Atmosphere
Sexually harassing conduct, as comtemplated by this factor, can be in
the form of visual, verbal, or physical harassment. This has been the
trend recognized by many of the circuit courts. The use of derogatory
language or name calling,53 the posting of pornography in the work
place,5 4 and the physical touching of a co-worker55 have all been found
to create a hostile environment. The EEOC guidelines also recognize
this spectrum of actiity.56 Thus, under this factor courts should con-
tinue to consider all of these activities as sexually harassing conduct that
might constitute a hostile work environment. Furthermore, courts
should follow the lead of the Second Circuit in finding physical touching
of an employee more determinative of a hostile work environment.57
when accepted, give rise to the mandatory inference that the employee was sexually harassed
in the way contemplated by that specific factor. Under the theory presented in this article,
once all the evidence has been introduced, the jury must then balance all five factors and
determine, looking at the totally of the circumstances, if a hostile environment has been cre-
ated. The effect of the presumption may be avoided by the employer "by proving the nonexis-
tence of the basic facts that support the presumed fact." See id. at 59.
53. See Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1498-1501 (M.D. Fla.
1991) (finding that language such as "pussy", "cunt", and "lick me" contributed to the crea-
tion of a hostile work environment).
54. See Andrews, 895 F.2d 1469 (holding that the placing of pornographic pictures in com-
mon areas and the showing of pornographic pictures during work hours constituted a hostile
work environment).
55. See Carrero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 890 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that
supervisor's touching of employee on her knee, kissing of employee's neck, and attempting to
kiss employee on her mouth created a hostile work environment).
56. Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1993) (stating
that "[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical
conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment... ").
57. Newsday, Inc. v. Long Island lyp. Union, 915 F.2d 840, 842 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. de-
nied, 449 U.S. 922 (1991) (holding that brushing against a coworker's lower back and buttocks
and slamming against her back was considered to be physical contact that would constitute a
hostile work environment); see supra note 55 and accompanying text.
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Physical touching, because of its intrusiveness, should be ascribed
greater weight than verbal or visual harassment.
Second, it should not matter in developing a claim of hostile work
environment whether sexually harassing conduct is targeted at one spe-
cific individual or whether the conduct permeates the whole environ-
ment and is directed at all individuals of a particular class. Each of these
situations is equally offensive, and both scenarios should constitute a
sexually hostile work environment under this factor. If one person is
targeted with sexual insults, inquiries, or acts, a court could determine
that the individual has been singled out and viewed in a primarily sexual
way, which might constitute sexual harassment.58 A hostile work envi-
ronment, however, should still be found in those cases where the insults,
activities, and actions permeate the entire work environment and target
a whole class of people rather that just one individual. A primary exam-
ple of sexual harassment that permeates the environment is the constant
display of pornographic pictures of women in common areas of the
workplace. Such far-reaching activity should be found to create a sexu-
ally hostile work environment, since it would affect all women that work
in that environment.59
Third, the frequency of the sexually harassing conduct must be con-
sidered. The Supreme Court has explicitly stated that a "mere offensive
utterance" is not enough to constitute a hostile work environment.6 °
Nonetheless, this statement should not be interpreted, to mean that one
act will, in all circumstances, be insufficient to create a hostile work envi-
ronment. Rather, some activities are so offensive that one act should
constitute a hostile work environment.61 The majority of the circuit
58. Abrams, supra note 33, at 1212-13.
59. For example, in Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469 (3d Cir. 1990), and
Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986), two different circuit courts came to
opposite conclusions on the issue of whether posting pictures of nude or partially nude women
in common areas would be grounds for a sexually harassing environment. In Andrews, the
court recognized that pornography could be viewed as highly offensive to women employees,
even though the male employees might find these actions to be harmless. 895 F.2d at 1485-86.
In Rabidue, the court found that the nude posters had a "de minimis effect on the plaintiff's
work environment when considered in the context of a society that condones and publicly"
displays sexually explicit material at the newsstands. 805 F.2d at 622.
60. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 371 (1993).
61. Although courts have traditionally required more than one act in order to find a hos-
tile environment, one commentator shows that frequency is not always necessary. Abrams,
supra note 33, at 1212. Ms. Abrams argues that a single act should at times be determinative
of a hostile work environment:
A second factor that courts should consider is the frequency of the conduct.... Courts
have erred in implying such a requirement in some cases involving sexual demands.
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courts, however, hold that increased incidents of sexual harassment will
create a stronger hostile work environment claim.62 Employees who are
exposed to repeated instances of sexual insults, for example, would find
it increasingly difficult to maintain their professional self-image and the
respect of others.63
Regarding where the sexual harassment occurs, the majority of cases
concern harassment that occurs at the place of work. A claim of hostile
work environment, however, may also arise away from the workplace,
such as on a business trip64 or during business related engagements, if
the sexually harassing incident occurred in a work-related context.
B. An Employer's Reaction to the Existence of Sexually Harassing
Behavior in the Workplace is Inadequate
The Supreme Court has refused to adopt a bright-line principle that
employers are liable for all of the actions of their employees.65 The
Some behavior-such as an unambiguous sexual request from a supervisor-is so in-
herently coercive, or so powerful in its ability to sexualize, that a single incident may be
sufficient to poison the atmosphere for a woman employee. Nonetheless, frequency
may be more helpful in assessing verbally based harassment claims.
Idt
62. King v. Board of Regents, 898 F2d 533, 537 (7th Cir. 1990) (stating that the strength
of the claim depends upon the number of incidents and the intensity of the incidents); An-
drews, 895 F.2d at 1484 (noting that harassment is more pervasive when incidents occur with
regularity); Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 620 (stating that "sexually hostile or intimidating environ-
ments are characterized by multiple and varied combinations and frequencies of offensive
exposures").
63. Abrams, supra note 33, at 1212-13.
64. See Anderson v. Kelley, No. 92-6663, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 32963, at *33-34 (6th Cir.
Dec. 15, 1993) (per curiam) (stating that it did not matter that alleged harassing behavior took
place during a business trip).
65. The Supreme Court has stated:
We therefore decline the parties' invitation to issue a definitive rule on employer liabil-
ity, but we do agree with the EEOC that Congress wanted Courts to look to agency
principles for guidance in this area. While some common-law principles may not be
transferable in all their particulars to Title VII, Congress' decision to define "em-
ployer" to include any "agent" of an employer, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b), surely evinces an
intent to place some limits on the acts of employees for which employers under Title
VII are to be held responsible. For this reason, we hold that the Court of Appeals
erred in concluding that employers are always automatically liable for sexual harass-
ment by their supervisors.
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986); compare id with 29 C.F.R.
§ 1604.11(c) (1993) (advancing a principle holding employers strictly liable for the actions of
their employees).
Many circuit courts have used the principle of respondeat superior to hold employers lia-
ble for their employee's harassing activities. See Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1482; Rabidue, 805 F.2d
at 619-20. Respondeat superior is a theory of imputed negligence whereby an employer is
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more widely advanced principle being adopted by this factor is that em-
ployers should be held liable for the actions of their employees when
employers knew or should have known that sexual harassment was oc-
curring, but failed to take action.66 Under this factor, an employee could
prove "that the employer knew or should have known of the harassment
-.. by showing that she complained to higher management of the harass-
ment... or by showing the pervasiveness of the harassment, which gives
rise to the inference of knowledge or constructive knowledge. ' 67 Also,
the employer's knowledge of an employee's prior harassing activities
should prove highly relevant in finding that the employer constructively
knew of subsequent harassing activity by the employee.68
If an employee complains of sexually harassing behavior, the em-
ployer must respond with prompt, effective remedial measures, or the
courts should find that a hostile environment exists as comtemplated by
this factor.69 In determining whether an employer took appropriate ac-
tions, the trier of fact should look at whether the actions taken were
"reasonably calculated to prevent further harassment under the particu-
lar facts and circumstances of the case at the time the allegation [was]
made."70 In assessing this factor, the process that was developed by the
held strictly liable if an employee commits a tort while acting within the scope of employment.
As stated above, however, the Supreme Court did not adopt this theory as controlling where
an employer should be held liable for a hostile environment claim. See Meritor, 477 U.S at 72.
66. Anderson, No. 92-6663, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 32963, at *34; Brooms v. Regal Tube
Co., 881 F.2d 412, 421 (7th Cir. 1989); Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100, 107 (4th Cir.
1989); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 905 (11th Cir. 1982).
67. Henson, 682 F.2d at 905.
68. Paroline, 879 F.2d at 107.
69. In Nash v. Electrospace Sys., Inc., 9 F.3d 401 (5th Cir. 1993), the court found an ade-
quate response by the employer where the company had an investigation underway within one
week of receiving complaints of sexual harassment, and the company transferred the com-
plainant to a new department without loss of pay or benefits so that she would be insulated
from the harassing conduct. Id at 404. The actions by the employers in Nash were seen to
effectively shield the employee from the harassment. Id. The company also reissued their
policy against sexual harassment to all new employees, which was seen as an adequate re-
sponse to a complaint of sexual harassment. Id. In Anderson, the court found that an em-
ployer's actions of physically relocating the plaintiff to a different area, which ended the
harassing conduct, was an adequate action to prevent a hostile work environment. No. 92-
6663, 1993 U.S. App. LExis 32963, at *34-35. In Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760
F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991), the court found a hostile work environment where the em-
ployer often took no action or took action after considerable delay when an employee com-
plained of sexually harassing behavior. Id. at 1531.
70. Brooms v. Regal Tube Co., 881 F.2d 412,421 (7th Cir. 1989). In Brooms, the plaintiff
complained to management of the explicit racial and sexual remarks which Gustafson, a co-
worker, had made to her. The manager spoke with Gustafson and had him apologize to
Broom, and told Gustafson that his salary increase would be postponed and that he would be
fired if he did this again. Id. at 416. For a few weeks the abusive behavior subsided, but it
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Fifth Circuit is most effective. The Fifth Circuit maintains that a prima
facie case of hostile work environment sexual harassment is made if an
employer does not take prompt remedial steps reasonably calculated to
end harassment in response to an employee's complaint. 71
Furthermore, courts should look more favorably upon employers
who take preventive measures. The EEOC guidelines on hostile work
environment emphasize the importance of preventing the sexual harass-
ment before it ever occurs, stating:
Prevention is the best tool for the elimination of sexual harass-
ment. An employer should take all steps necessary to prevent
sexual harassment from occurring, such as affirmatively raising
the subject, expressing strong disapproval, developing appropri-
ate sanctions, informing employees of their right to raise and how
to raise the issue of harassment under title VII, and developing
methods to sensitize all concerned.72
The Supreme Court has attempted to reward employers by stating that if
an employer has an expressed policy against sexual harassment which is
designed to respond to sexual harassment claims, then employers should
be protected from liability if employees do not take advantage of the
procedure and if the employers do not have knowledge of the harass-
ment.73 Retaining this policy would serve as an incentive for all employ-
ers to take preventive measures to discourage a hostile work
environment. Preventive measures would also benefit courts since this
would reduce the number of victims and result in fewer court cases.
C. An Employee Regards the Conduct as Undesirable, Offensive, or
Unwelcome
The Supreme Court,74 lower courts,75 and the EEOC76 have found it
critical that the employee regard the sexually harassing conduct as un-
later began again. Id. at 416-17. The court in Brooms found that a reasonable employer
would have responded differently, and therefore the Title VII claim was upheld. Id at 427. In
Waltman v. International Paper Co., 875 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1989), when an employee com-
plained of sexual harassment by coworkers, the employer told her that "he would take care of
it." However, the harassment continued. The court held that the employer would be held
liable if the remedial steps taken by the employer were not reasonably calculated to end the
harassment. Id. at 479. The actions of the employer in Waltman were not seen as steps rea-
sonably calculated to end the harassment. Id
71. Petersen & Massengill, supra note 3, at 499.
72. Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(f) (1993).
73. Mentor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986).
74. Id. at 68.
75. Burns v. McGregor Elec. Indus., Inc., 989 F.2d 959, 964 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that a
victim must prove that "she was subject to unwelcome sexual harassment"); Ellison v. Brady,
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welcome. Similarly, this factor requires the presence of unwelcome con-
duct in order to bring a claim of sexual harassment. In Meritor, the
Supreme Court stated that "[t]he gravamen of any sexual harassment
claim is that the alleged sexual advances were 'unwelcome.' ",77 The
Court stated that "[t]he correct inquiry is whether [an employee] by her
conduct indicated that the alleged sexual advances were unwelcome,"
rather than whether the employee voluntarily participated in the harass-
ment.78 Courts have considered conduct harassing and unwelcome when
"the employee did not solicit or incite" the conduct, and when "the em-
ployee regarded the conduct as undesirable or offensive. 79
Courts must be careful when considering the element of unwelcome
conduct, because in the past, this factor has been improperly discounted
in certain circumstances. For example, in Burns v. McGregor Electronic
Industries, Inc.,8" the appellate court found that the trial court improp-
erly held that since an employee had posed nude in a magazine, she
would not have considered the sexual advances of her co-workers as un-
welcome or offensive.8 Under this factor, an employee's conduct in a
non-work-related environment should not be determinative of that em-
924 F.2d 872, 875-76 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating "that a hostile environment exists when an em-
ployee can show... that this conduct was unwelcome"); Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d
100, 105 (4th Cir. 1989) (stating that "the plaintiff must show that the conduct in question was
unwelcome"); Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611,619 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481
U.S. 1041 (1987) (stating that "to prevail in a Title VII offensive work environment sexual
harassment action, [a plaintiff] must assert and prove that ... [she] was subjected to un-
welcomed harassment in the form of sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, or other
verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature"); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 903
(11th Cir. 1982) (holding that the employee must show that she "was subject to unwelcome
sexual harassment").
76. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1993) (stating that "[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for
sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual
harassment.").
77. 477 U.S. at 68.
78. Id.; see supra note 17 (giving a brief summary of the facts of Meritor). Vinson brought
a Title VII claim against Meritor Savings Bank and the respondent attempted to get the
charges dropped by stating that Vinson voluntarily had sexual relations with Taylor. It was to
this claim that the Court stated that the proper consideration is not whether the petitioner's
participation was voluntary, but whether the sexual advances were welcome. Id. at 68. The
Court was distinguishing between voluntary and unwelcome; a victim of harassment could
voluntarily give in to sexual advances, although the advances were unwelcome. Thus, it
should be the unwelcomeness of the encounter that is considered. Id. The Court found that
the sexual advances of the supervisor were not welcomed by the Petitioner in that case. Id. at
73.
79. Henson, 682 F.2d at 903.
80. 989 F.2d 959 (8th Cir. 1993).
81. Id. at 962-63. The appellate court reversed the decision of the lower court and found
that the reasoning of the lower court was clearly in error. Id. at 963. The court stated:
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ployee's work-related conduct8 2 Also, other courts have improperly
found that since a claimant was used to an environment that was disgust-
ing and degrading, she would not find harassing behavior unwelcome.83
This element of the standard stipulates that if an employee finds an at-
mosphere disgusting and degrading, the harassing behavior would be un-
welcome regardless of past experiences.
Manner of dress and behavior of a female employee has also been
considered by some courts when determining whether harassing behav-
ior is unwelcome. Whether this is appropriate is a difficult issue because
men and women differ on the role that dress and behavior plays in the
workplace.84 Regardless, courts appear to concentrate on behavior
when determining if advances were considered unwelcome. Examples of
questioned behavior include where the female employee tells sexual sto-
ries or engages in sexual gestures at work, or where the employee initi-
ates sexual conversation or seeks out sexual encounters with
coworkers.8 Under this factor, behavior should be considered when de-
termining if advances are unwelcome. However, the issue of behavior
must be approached with an open mind, avoiding the potential for ste-
reotypes to cloud objectivity. It is important that the issue of behavior
be approached without any preconceived stereotypes.
Under this factor, the most determinative indicator of unwelcome be-
havior of an alleged harasser should be the verbal responses of the
We hold that the such a view is unsupported in law. If the court intended this as a
standard or rationale for a standard, it is clearly in error. This rationale would allow a
complete stranger to pursue sexual behavior at work that a female worker would ac-
cept from her husband or boyfriend. This standard would allow a male employee to
kiss or fondle a female worker at the workplace.
Id.
82. I& 'This statement contemplates the reasoning of the appellate court in Burns, and it
draws the conclusion that non-work-related activity should never be used as an excuse for the
harassment of an employee.
83. In Sauers v. Salt Lake County, 1 F.3d 1122 (10th Cir. 1993), an employee in the Salt.
Lake County Attorney's Office filed a sexual harassment claim when the conduct of a supervi-
sor was seen to turn from "coarse" to sexually harassing. Id at 1126. The behavior of the
superior included: grabbing another female employee's breast, making comments about the
plaintiff's breasts, asking the plaintiff to "swap spit," and rubbing his groin against another
employee's shoulder. Id. at 1126-27. Since the plaintiff stated that she was used to working
with cops and being in a rough atmosphere, the court made the determination that the plain-
tiff merely considered the behavior "disgusting and degrading" instead of unwelcome. Id. at
1127. This standard would propose that being "used to" certain actions does not necessarily
mean those actions are welcome.
84. Ms. Ehrenreich claims that many men believe that women could avoid harassment if
they "behaved properly." Ehrenreich, supra note 1, at 1208. This reasoning makes it seem as
though the victim of harassment is in some way to blame for the harassment.
85. Burns v. McGregor Elec. Indus., Inc., 989 F.2d 959, 963 (8th Cir. 1993).
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harassed employee. If the harassed employee conveys that she does not
welcome the harassing behavior, or if the employee goes to a supervisor
and complains of the harasser's behavior, it should carry significant
weight. 6 Looking to the spoken words of the employee as an indication
of unwelcomeness would, to some extent, eliminate the dispute over
what men and women consider dress or behavior that invites sexual con-
duct. If a verbal expression of unwelcomeness is made, these words
should be interpreted as unequivocal. Lack of a verbal protestation,
however, should not preclude a finding of unwelcomeness. This factor
may still be established by looking at other nonverbal communications
made by the employee that convey unwelcomeness.
D. An Employee Subjectively Perceives the Situation to Be Harassing
This factor attempts to recognize that not all men or women perceive
a situation in the same manner, and this difference should be taken into
consideration.17 Most recently, in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,' the
Supreme Court recognized that the victim's subjective perception that
the work environment is hostile must be considered. 9 "The subjective
factor is crucial because it demonstrates that the alleged conduct injured
[a] particular plaintiff giving her a claim for judicial relief."9
This subjective consideration, however, could be used in an improper
manner and could work to the disadvantage of the plaintiff, if care is not
86. In Trautvetter v. Quick, 916 F.2d 1140 (7th Cir. 1990), the principal of the school
started to make sexual advances towards one of the teachers. Id. at 1142. The court decided
that since this teacher never actually indicated that the advances of the principal were unwel-
come, but instead either laughed off the advances or just said no and then finally began a
sexual relationship with this man, she did not properly convey the message that the advances
were unwelcome. Id. at 1149.
87. In Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., the court explained why it is important to take into
consideration the subjective perspective of the victim:
[A] proper assessment or evaluation of an employment environment that gives rise to a
sexual harassment claim would invite consideration of such objective and subjective
factors as the nature of the alleged harassment, the background and experience of the
plaintiff, her coworkers, and supervisors, the totality of the physical environment of the
plaintiff's work area, the lexicon of obscenity that pervaded the environment of the
workplace both before and after the plaintiff's introduction into its environs, coupled
with the reasonable expectation of the plaintiff upon voluntarily entering that environ-
ment. Thus, the presence of actionable sexual harassment would be different depend-
ing upon the personality of the plaintiff and the prevailing work environment and must
be considered and evaluated upon an ad hoc basis.
805 F.2d 611, 620 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987).
88. 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993).
89. Id at 370.
90. Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1483 (3d Cir. 1990).
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taken. For example, as recounted earlier, the trial court in Burns v. Mc-
Gregor Electronic Industries, Inc.91 improperly found that a plaintiff
would not have been offended by the sexual advances of her coworkers,
because she had posed nude in a magazine.9 The trial court reasoned
that a woman who would pose nude in a magazine would not find sexual
remarks from coworkers offensive. The appellate court found this rea-
soning "unsupported in law." 93
Another concern with this factor is that of the overly sensitive victim.
It appears that courts have avoided this problem by placing greater em-
phasis on other factors.94 Similarly, the scheme established by this new
standard combats the problem of the hypersensitive victim by establish-
ing a number of factors which must be weighed; only by tipping the bal-
ance in favor of the victim can a claim of hostile work environment be
proven. Therefore, hypersensitive victims could not prove that a hostile
work environment existed without proving other factors as well which
would tip the balance in their favor.
E. Harassing Behavior Interferes with the Employee's Well-Being or
Ability to Perform the Job
If a plaintiff suffers either psychological harm or suffers other injuries
due to sexual harassment in the workplace, this should constitute a hos-
tile environment. The psychological effect upon the victim of sexual har-
assment was one factor which many circuit courts found dispositive in
determining whether a hostile environment was created. 95  The
Supreme Court decided Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.96 in order to re-
solve the conflicts between the circuit courts on whether psychological
harm was necessary to prove a hostile environment. 97 The Court stated:
91. 989 F.2d 959 (8th Cir. 1993).
92. Id. at 963.
93. Id
94. Saxton v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 10 F.3d 526, 534 (7th Cir. 1993) (placing more
emphasis on objective inquiry, rather than subjective inquiry); Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879
F.2d 100, 105 (4th Cir. 1989) (citation omitted) (declining "to focus solely on the plaintiff's
subjective reaction, because '[a]n employee may not be unreasonably sensitive to his [or her]
working environment' ").
95. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 877-78 (9th Cir. 1991) (expressly rejecting Rabidue's
requirement that the employee's psychological well-being must be seriously affected);
Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 620 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041
(1987) (requiring a serious effect on the employee's psychological well-being in order to prove
a hostile work environment).
96. 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993).
97. Id. at 370.
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Title VII comes into play before the harassing conduct leads to a
nervous breakdown. A discriminatorily abusive work environ-
ment, even one that does not seriously affect employees' psycho-
logical well-being, can and often will detract from employees' job
performance, discourage employees from remaining on the job,
or keep them from advancing in their careers.... The appalling
conduct alleged in Meritor, and the reference in that case to envi-
ronments "'so heavily polluted with discrimination as to destroy
completely the emotional and psychological stability of minority
group workers,'" . .. merely present some especially egregious
examples of harassment. They do not mark the boundary of what
is actionable.98
Therefore, it is not necessary to prove that psychological harm occurred,
but it will help to bolster the employee's claim of hostile work
environment.99
Other injuries, such as interference with one's ability to perform the
job, should also be seen as determinative of a hostile environment.100
Courts have found interference where an employee fears coming to
work because of harassment by a supervisor, or where employees cannot
concentrate on their work because of sexually harassing conduct. 1 ' In-
terference also has been found where an employee resigned from the job
due to sexually harassing conduct. 0 2 It is not necessary, however, to
prove that" 'tangible productivity has declined as a result of the harass-
ment.' "103 Rather, it can simply be shown that the sexually harassing
conduct has made it difficult for employees to perform their job."° This
distinction is critical, although often overlooked, as evidenced by the dif-
ferences among courts, even within the same circuit.'
98. Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 370-71 (quoting Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972)).
99. Id. at 371.
100. See Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3) (1993)
(stating that sexual harassment occurs when "conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasona-
bly interfering with an individual's work performance").
101. See Paroline, 879 F.2d at 105.
102. See Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1484 (3d Cir. 1990).
103. Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 372 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (quoting Davis v. Monsanto
Chem. Co., 858 F.2d 345, 349 (6th Cir. 1988)).
104. Id.
105. Compare King v. Board of Regents, 898 F.2d 533, 537 (7th Cir. 1990) (stating that a
loss of tangible job benefits is not necessary to prove a hostile environment) with Dockter v.
Rudolf Wolff Futures, Inc., 913 F.2d 456,460 (7th Cir. 1990) (finding that there was no hostile
environment because the employee failed to prove any injury due to the sexually harassing
conduct).
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CONCLUSION
The proposed standard attempts to establish one set of factors to
evaluate what constitutes a claim of hostile work environment sexual
harassment. Technically, this standard is not new since it is an effort to
consolidate what the Supreme Court, the lower courts, and the EEOC
have already found to constitute a hostile work environment. However,
the Supreme Court has refused to establish guidelines for what consti-
tutes a hostile work environment sexual harassment claim under Title
VII. Thus, the trend in sexual harassment cases has been "ad hoc."
With so little direction, courts have been forced to make their own deter-
minations of what constitutes a hostile work environment.
This Comment has attempted to develop a uniform standard for hos-
tile work environment that all courts can follow. The new standard de-
veloped here revolves around the following factors to analyze a hostile
work environment claim: (1) sexual harassment is directed at the individ-
ual employee, or sexual harassment is so overwhelming as to permeate
the general work environment; (2) employer's reaction to the existence
of sexually harassing behavior in the workplace is inadequate; (3) em-
ployee regards the conduct as undesirable, offensive, or unwelcome; (4)
employee subjectively perceives the situation as harassing; and (5)
harassing behavior interferes with the employee's well-being or ability to
perform a job.
Furthermore, this standard constitutes an attempt to inform both em-
ployees and employers of what activity will be viewed as sexual harass-
ment in the workplace. Thus, notice is provided to all parties.
Furthermore, the parties will better understand how sexual harassment
can be kept out of the workplace, and how they can strive towards
greater workplace equality-the ultimate goal of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act.
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